When President Tayyip Erdoğan went to Baghdad 12 years later, he aimed to make Iraq a partner in the war he wanted to expand against the PKK towards the summer. He put some things in his bag in Baghdad, but participating in the war is not one of them.
While the Iraqi government took a proactive stance against the conflict, it talked about granting political refugee status to PKK members. This confirms the divergence between Baghdad and Ankara, but it is necessary to ask whether it may indicate a different process after the military operation promised by Erdogan. For now, the wind is strong.
In order for the military strategy, which included a 30 km buffer zone, to be accepted in Baghdad, Erdoğan had three trump cards: the ‘water’ that Iraq longed for, the promising ‘Development Path’ and the lingering ‘oil shipment’. Let’s briefly look at where we have reached under three headings:
– The 17 billion dollar Development Road Project, with connections to Asia, originating from Gulf/Faw, connecting Iraq/Turkey and arriving in Europe, was signed by Iraq, Turkey, Qatar and the UAE, and crushed other headlines with its win-win metaphor. There is a phased schedule between 2028, 2033 and 2050 for the construction of the line, which will have energy and communication lines parallel to the roads and railways. A lot of water will flow under the bridges to see the end of the tunnel. In addition, since the gate to be opened from Ovaköy will bypass Habur, how restive Kurdistan will be associated with the new corridor will gain importance. Erdogan constructs the Development Path as a security barrier in which Turkey will control the Iraq-Syria border line, at least the part from Fishhabur to Rabia. It also includes a dimension that limits Kurdistan’s control in the region. Erdoğan’s visit to Erbil after Baghdad underlined relations with Kurdistan. Erdogan was happy to see the Turkish flag in Erbil. Kurdistan hopes for a response, but what it will get is unknown. This visit, which pleased the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), did not bring about a softening that would alleviate the unhappiness of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which was treated as an ‘enemy’ due to its closeness to the PKK on the Sulaymaniyah side. PUK asked Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani to bring up the removal of the decision closing Turkish airspace to Sulaymaniyah-bound flights, but there was no news. Kurdistan Deputy Prime Minister Kubat Talabani also broached the issue to Erdogan in Erbil, as if to say, “Excuse my brother.” Erdoğan did not say much.
– Iraq, which expects 400 cubic meters of water to be released per second from the Tigris and 500 cubic meters from the Euphrates, has approached Ankara’s line regarding water. According to the agreement, irrigation systems will be renewed with a fund to be established from oil revenues, open water channels will be converted into closed channels, and joint projects will be carried out to build dams that will provide regulation according to rainy and dry periods. A compromise in line with Ankara’s equitable sharing thesis. But the problem is not solved. The water file does not close easily. Implementing projects in Iraq, which has lost half of its agricultural land due to lack of water, also requires determination. Generally, committees are established and remain where they were established.
– Regarding oil, although negotiations continue on the $1.4 billion compensation from the arbitration in Paris and the second part of the case, Ankara announced that shipments will restart. Now it is time to open the lock between Baghdad and Erbil. Oil companies need to forget the agreements they made with Kurdistan and shake hands with the Iraqi oil company SOMO. Baghdad has now confirmed that the problem does not originate from Turkey.
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Let’s come to the strategic framework agreement or the hairy ‘fight against terrorism’ issue within it. This issue has not yet been finalized. Judging by the picture, Baghdad does not accompany Erdogan’s quest to expand military base areas and operations in the north. Conflict, war and tension are options excluded in Baghdad. It is not possible for the Iraqi army to take a position or mobilize in the north as Erdogan wants. What they can do is limited; stationing border guards in certain places, giving more emphasis to the agreement between Erbil and Baghdad to increase the control of the center in Shengal, making PKK-related structures invisible, etc.
The function of the joint operations center envisaged between the Turkish army, Iraqi central forces and Peshmerga may not go beyond measures to increase border security.
To appease Ankara, it was said, “We cannot allow an attack on another country other than Iraqi territory.” A common explanation. Additionally, it was emphasized that the Iraqi National Security Council declared the PKK a ‘banned organisation’. These were welcomed. The definition of banned organization is important. No serious changes or measures are expected in practice. Iraqis do not want to suddenly turn relations with the PKK into a ‘hostile’ relationship. They think that “when Turkey solves its own Kurdish problem, the PKK will also be solved.” They also see Turkey’s operations as a violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Those who call this “occupation” and even fire rockets at the Bashiqa base are among the stakeholders of the Sudanese government. This will not change easily after the visit in which two agreements, two protocols and 22 memorandums of understanding were signed.
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Erdoğan reiterated his expectation that the PKK will be declared a ‘terrorist organization’ and its presence in Iraq will be completely ended. Have the Iraqis mischievously asked, “Wasn’t it you who made the agreement with Abdullah Öcalan to withdraw PKK armed elements across the border in 2013?” or “Wasn’t it the Turkish state that has not solved the Kurdish problem for decades and has constantly pushed the PKK across the border with military operations?” Of course not!
Speaking of partnership in the war, Iraqi Government Spokesperson Basim al-Awvadi made a striking statement to Rudaw. “Each PKK member in Iraq will be considered a political refugee, but will not have the right to engage in political or military activity or carry weapons. They will be supervised by the Iraqi government, the UN and international humanitarian organizations. “This is how Iraq will approach them,” he said. He also emphasized that they will handle the PKK issue as in the security agreement with Iran. Iran bombed the places where Iranian Kurdish parties were located, forced Baghdad to make an agreement with the threat of invasion, and then the camps were evacuated and security measures were increased along the border. Some of the Iranian Kurds were later taken to UN-controlled camps. However, the PKK, with its base camps, areas, number of fighters, weapon capacity, conflict experience, network of relationships, and political and civilian extensions that have penetrated as far as Kirkuk, has a scale incomparable with Iranian parties. And especially when it comes to Qandil, the party Turkey should talk to is Tehran, not Baghdad. As you know, Kandil extends along the borders of Iran.
Iraq’s approach to political asylum can be addressed in three scenarios:
– First, this reflects Baghdad’s choice to handle the issue despite Ankara and its tendency to view the PKK as a political movement. Kurds, who moved several times after their villages in Turkey were burned down in the 1990s and eventually camped in Mahmur, also live with refugee status. There is a UN office at the entrance of Mahmur camp, whose population exceeds 12 thousand. But the camp residents are exercising decentralization. The camp is under the control of cadres and resembles a small canton.
– Secondly, Baghdad may be showing Turkey a way in its own way, based on Mahmur. But saying goodbye to arms and transitioning to civilian life requires a big compromise. The place where reconciliation will come from is the solution process in Turkey. Otherwise, it is not possible for refugee status to have any value. For those in the mountains, it is nothing more than fantasy.
– Thirdly, refugee status may have been discussed with Türkiye. This means that Erdoğan will enter a softening process after the hot summer scenario. Let us also leave the information here that the Americans have brought up the idea of finding a place of exile for those in Qandil several times.
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It is obvious that Erdoğan is making both military and psychological preparations for a major war. Whether he can take the helm elsewhere afterwards is a million-dollar question.
In all his messages for months, Erdoğan has insisted on adding another harsh link to the Claw-Lock series that has been going on since 2019. He is determined to do this regardless of the weather in Iraq. This means that tensions with Iraq will continue despite the fanfare of the new page. Erdogan wants to make full use of the harmony he has regained with the EU and the USA on the basis of NATO. Yes, hardening is a choice. Operations against DEM and Mesopotamia Agency at home and increasing pressure on the Kurdish movement abroad, especially in France and Belgium, are developing parallel to this choice.
Question seeking answer; After putting all his effort into breaking the PKK’s back, can Erdoğan turn to his partners and team, who breathe nothing but gunpowder, and say, “Come here with military means”? Can he return to 2011-2013 ground? Or is he relying on a new constitutional amendment and a war that will terrorize domestic politics to perpetuate his power? Just like he did between two elections in 2015.
